India sets out trade-remedy, forced-labour positions at G20 meeting

Key points

• The G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting took place in Milwaukee on September 30 and October 1, 2026; the PIB readout was published on October 2. ^[1][2]
• India called for anti-dumping and countervailing measures to be WTO-consistent, evidence-based, case-specific and open to judicial review. ^[3]
• Piyush Goyal said border action on forced labour should rely on specific, verifiable evidence rather than assumptions about whole countries, regions or sectors. ^[3][4]
• The G20 did not reach consensus on forced labour or structural excess capacity, according to Reuters and the U.S. chair’s account. ^[4][5]
• India’s July notification created a forced-labour import prohibition framework, with goods to be specified through later government action and an investigation procedure. ^[6]

What happened

India’s Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal used the concluding day of the G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Milwaukee to set out New Delhi’s positions on several live trade questions. The ministerial itself was held on September 30 and October 1, according to the official G20 events calendar. The Press Information Bureau published its account of Goyal’s remarks on October 2, describing sessions on structural excess capacity, the most-favoured-nation principle, forced labour in global supply chains and the meeting’s closing discussion. ^[1][2]

The timing matters because the PIB release is a readout of India’s intervention, not a record of a new Indian law or a comprehensive agreement by all G20 members. The U.S. Trade Representative’s chair statement said ministers had candid discussions on forced labour, excess capacity and MFN, but did not reach consensus on forced labour. Reuters likewise reported that ministers failed to agree on statements covering forced labour and structural excess industrial capacity. ^[4][5]

The meeting therefore produced a clear account of competing positions rather than a single policy package on the issues at the centre of India’s remarks. The only consensus highlighted in the U.S. account concerned a statement condemning the weaponisation of food through coercive trade actions, which is separate from the trade-remedy and forced-labour issues covered here. ^[4]

What India said

On industrial capacity, Goyal said India did not have structural excess capacity in the sectors identified by the G20 presidency. He argued that industrial capacity itself should not automatically be treated as a trade distortion. India shares concerns, he said, that government support in some economies can contribute to dumping and predatory pricing, but those concerns should be addressed through established World Trade Organization tools.

The PIB account says Goyal specifically cited anti-dumping and countervailing duties that are consistent with WTO rules, based on evidence and subject to judicial review. He also said that geographic concentration driven by hidden subsidies or other support could create distortions, while supply-chain diversification could be legitimate if it was not used as a pretext for measures outside WTO rules. India’s position, as reported by PIB, is thus a distinction between capacity as a condition and demonstrable support or pricing practices as the basis for a remedy. ^[3]

Goyal also defended the MFN principle as part of a transparent and non-discriminatory trading system. He said consensus remains central to WTO decision-making, special and differential treatment should be preserved for developing countries, and the two-tier dispute-settlement system should be restored. He further argued that developing countries need policy space to industrialise and meet domestic needs. These are policy positions, not evidence that the G20 adopted India’s preferred wording. ^[3]

Forced-labour safeguards

On forced labour, Goyal said India’s commitment to elimination was “absolute and unconditional”. He referred to Article 23 of the Constitution, which prohibits forced labour, and to India’s ratification of International Labour Organization Conventions 29 and 105. The minister also said border measures should be based on specific and verifiable evidence, respect due process and comply with WTO rules. He opposed presumptions about entire countries, regions or sectors. ^[3]

The PIB readout also records India’s support for voluntary exchanges of good practices among G20 members, provided such cooperation did not become monitoring of members, create new obligations or allow shared information to be used for unilateral trade action. That qualification is significant: India supported the objective of eliminating forced labour while arguing for a defined evidentiary and procedural threshold before trade restrictions are imposed.

The U.S. chair’s account supplies the essential counterpoint. Ambassador Jamieson Greer said Mexico and Argentina joined the United States in a separate statement on eliminating forced labour, but the G20 as a whole did not reach consensus. Reuters reported the same lack of agreement. India’s remarks should therefore not be described as a G20 ban, a G20 approval of India’s approach or a completed multilateral enforcement mechanism. ^[4][5]

The July import-policy framework

The forced-labour reference at the ministerial points back to a separate Indian policy action. DGFT’s notification listing identifies Notification No. 23/2026-27, dated July 13, 2026, as the measure inserting paragraphs 2.20B and 11.64 into the Foreign Trade Policy 2023. The notification says imports of goods produced or manufactured wholly or partly through forced labour are prohibited in principle, but it also says the central government may specify the goods by notification after considering an enquiry or other material. ^[6]

The notification prescribes a DGFT investigation procedure through the Handbook of Procedures and says the provisions take effect after 30 days from publication in the Official Gazette. Reuters’ account, published July 14, similarly described a framework under which India’s foreign-trade body would investigate whether imported goods used forced labour and recommend action after consultations. The policy should therefore be understood as a legal framework and delegated process, not proof that every product or shipment has already been individually banned. ^[6]

The notification also defines forced labour by reference to the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29). That legal detail supports the source-bounded connection Goyal made at the G20 meeting, while leaving operational questions—such as product-specific notifications, evidence thresholds and findings in individual cases—to later action.

What happens next

The G20’s disagreement leaves the issues open for further ministerial and WTO discussions. India’s stated preference is for case-specific remedies supported by evidence, protection of developing-country policy space and a multilateral system with restored appellate review. The U.S. chair’s statement indicates that some members wanted a pathway toward cooperative action on excess capacity, while others rejected that approach. ^[4]

For forced labour, the practical follow-up is separate from the Milwaukee discussion: Indian authorities would need to use the DGFT framework, identify goods through the prescribed process and apply any restriction with the evidence and due-process safeguards described in the notification and Goyal’s remarks. No source reviewed here establishes a new October 2 prohibition against a named product, a completed investigation or a binding G20 agreement. India’s intervention is best read as a statement of how it wants trade and labour measures to be designed as the debate continues.

India also extended full support to the United Kingdom for the G20 presidency in 2027, marking the next chairing phase rather than a successor decision on the disputed trade issues. ^[3]